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Abstract: We show that  contrary to conventional wisdom  intergenerational family
transfers dominate fiscal policies as a remedy to the dynamic inefficiency arising in a Diamond
(1965, American Economic Review) economy with logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas
technology. Using the demonstration-effect approach popularized by Cox and Stark (2005,
Journal of Public Economics), we prove that, differently from public debt, family transfers
can serve the role of automatic stabilizers. Indeed, they are nil under dynamic efficiency,
implying that both capital accumulation and welfare are not worsened. They are positive
under dynamic inefficiency, and instrumental to depress capital accumulation so to approach
the Golden Rule capital stock.
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1 Introduction.
Dynamic efficiency is a relevant issue to evaluate the effects of fiscal (debt) policies on
economic growth. This analysis is usually developed in the overlapping generations settings
of Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974), both considering finitely lived agents. In Diamond
(1965) people are pure life cyclers, dynamic inefficiency can arise and then there is a case
for fiscal policy such as public debt. In Barro (1974) agents are linked across generations
by altruistic bequests. In such a setting public debt is neutral and the market equilibrium
is dynamically efficient. However, Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) argue1 that the dynamic
efficiency result of Diamond (1965) is a necessary condition for an altruistic bequest motive to
matter and then for the Barro's debt neutrality theorem to hold. Yet, one important question
remains open: Can such a dynamic inefficiency be removed by introducing intergenerational
family transfers?
In this note, we show that the answer is positive as long as parents can shape the pref-
erences of their children. Using the demonstration-effect approach popularized by2 Cox and
Stark (2005), we establish two results. First, family transfers are positive if and only if
there is dynamic inefficiency. We can therefore interpreted them as automatic stabilizers,
a role that is not performed by public debt policies, which worsen welfare under dynamic ef-
ficiency. Second, when there are positive transfers, there exists a saddle path that converges
to a steady state in which the capital stock can be made arbitrarily close to the Golden Rule
one.
2 The economy.
Consider a perfectly competitive economy evolving over infinite discrete time. A homogenous
good is produced at each period t using two factors physical capital, Kt, and labor, Lt via
1Nevertheless, their characterization of equilibrium rests on the assumption of existence, uniqueness and
stability of the steady state of the Diamond (1965) economy (see Galor and Ryder, 1989, for the necessary
and sufficient conditions). Relaxing these standard assumptions, Thibault (2000, 2008) identifies the full set
of necessary and sufficient conditions for obtaining the Barro's debt neutrality theorem.
2Using recent household survey microdata, Cox and Stark (2005) empirically emphasizes the relevancy
of the demonstration-effect approach. Alternatively, the impact of demographic structure, human capital
and endogenous fertility on capital accumulation and dynamic efficiency are respectively studied by d'Albis
(2007), Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007), and Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014).
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a Cobb-Douglas technology AKαt L
1−α
t with α ∈ (0, 1) and A > 0. Capital fully depreciates
after one period. As markets are perfectly competitive, each factor is paid its marginal
product, i.e. wt = (1 − α)Akαt and Rt = αAkα−1t , where wt and Rt are the wage and the
interest factor, respectively, at time t and kt = Kt/Lt.
Population is constant and consists of agents who live for two periods. Agents born
in t supply a fixed amount of labor, receive wt, consume ct and save st when they are
young. They earn and consume dt+1 when they are old. Preferences are represented by
the logarithmic life-cycle utility function, Ut = ln ct + ln dt+1. At each t young agents
are allowed to transfer a fraction xt ∈ [0, 1] of their income wt to their parents, so that
Ut = U(xt, xt+1, st) = ln[(1 − xt)wt − st] + ln[Rt+1st + xt+1wt+1]. Following Cox and Stark
(2005), we posit3 that the demonstration can be imperfect by assuming that with probability
pi a child simply imitates his parent's action, while with probability 1 − pi he chooses an
action to maximize his expected utility, anticipating that his own child may be an imitator.
Therefore agents born at t maximize piU(xt, xt, st) + (1− pi)U(xt, xt+1, st) with respect to xt
and st.
The capital stock in period t + 1 is financed by the savings of the generation born in t,
i.e. kt+1 = st. Two different dynamics of capital accumulation are thus possible depending
on whether family transfers are positive or not.
2.1 Dynamics with no intergenerational family transfers.
Without family transfers (i.e. xt = xt+1 = 0), agents maximize U(0, 0, st) = ln[wt − st] +
lnRt+1st with respect to st. This coincides with the standard Diamond (1965) economy;
using the first order condition it is straightforward to see that st = wt/2. Thus, the dynamics
of capital accumulation are given by: kt+1 = (1 − α)Akαt /2. Starting from k0 > 0, the
economy exhibits monotone convergence towards kD = [(1− α)A/2]1/(1−α).
2.2 Dynamics with positive intergenerational family transfers.
When transfers are positive, the optimal pair (x?t , s
?
t ) must verify the two following first order
conditions:
3The demonstration-effect approach can also be useful to study the issue of the long-term care financing
(see Canta and Pestieau, 2013).
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− wt
(1− x?t )wt − s?t
+
piwt+1
Rt+1s?t + x
?
twt+1
= 0 (1)
− 1
(1− x?t )wt − s?t
+
piRt+1
Rt+1s?t + x
?
twt+1
+
(1− pi)Rt+1
Rt+1s?t + xt+1wt+1
= 0 (2)
As pi is time-invariant, the planning problem faced by each generation is the same as that
faced by its predecessors so that (1) and (2) must be satisfied at each period.
Let xt = ϑ(Xt) = 1/[(1 − α)Xt] − α/(1 − α). Using this change of variable we have
Rt+1st+xtwt+1 = AX
−1
t k
α
t+1 and (1−xt)(1−α) = 1−X−1t . After simplifications, we obtain
from (1):
kt+1 = ϕ(kt, Xt) = Ak
α
t
(
1− 1 + pi
piXt
)
(3)
Furthermore, using the fact that Rt+1/[Rt+1st + xτwt+1] = αXτ/kt+1 we obtain after
simplifications from (2):
Xt+1 = ψ(Xt) =
(1− α)pi
α(1− pi)Xt −
1 + pi
α(1− pi) (4)
The dynamics of X (and then of xt), described by (4) are independent of k and, thus,
straightforward. They are represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The dynamics of Xt and xt
Characterizing these dynamics in terms of X (rather than in terms of x) allows us to
work with an arithmetic-geometric sequence that has a unique stationary point: X? =
(1 + pi)/(pi − α). As 1/Xt = α + (1 − α)xt, 0 < x? < 1 if and only if 1 < X? < 1/α.
Consequently, transfers are positive if and only if pi > pi = 2α/(1− α).
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The two dimensional dynamical system, denoted S, which describes the equilibrium paths
in a neighborhood of the steady state (x?, k?) with positive transfers is such that:
(System S)
 Xt+1 = ψ(Xt)kt+1 = ϕ(kt, Xt)
where the functions ψ and ϕ are respectively defined in (3) and (4), xt = ϑ(Xt), x
? =
ϑ(X?) = (pi − pi)/(1 + pi) and k? = ϕ(k?, X?) = [Aα/pi] 11−α .
We assume that there exist old generations of agents, born at time t = −1, whose
behavior s−1 = k0 is known at t = 0. Hence, S is a two dimensional dynamical system with
one predetermined variables, kt and one forward variable xt.
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Figure 2: The phase diagram and the saddle path
We show in Appendix A that the steady-state (x?, k?) is a regular saddle point;4 the
dynamics in the neighborhood of (x?, k?) are described in Figure 2.
Our analysis allows for an explicit characterization of the saddle path. On this path we
have xt+1 = xt = x
? and consequently the dynamics of optimal capital accumulation are
4Let us precise the notion of saddle point that is usually employed in the optimal growth literature: a
steady state (x?, k?) of the two dimensional dynamical system S is a regular saddle point if and only if the
dimension of the local stable manifold is equal to 1. The projection of the local stable manifold on the space
(xt, kt) is a local diffeomorphism. Then for each initial values k0 close to k
?, there exist a unique x0 such
that (x0, k0) is on the stable manifold and the equilibrium path converges to the steady state.
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given by kt+1 = ϕ(kt, X
?), i.e. kt+1 = αAk
α
t /pi. Then, starting from k0 > 0, the economy
exhibits monotone convergence towards k? = [αA/pi]
1
1−α .
3 Optimal capital accumulation and dynamic efficiency.
Since the sign of pi−pi is time-independent, no switch is possible: family transfers are either
positive or nil at all periods. We thus identify two regimes, characterized by the presence
(or absence) of transfers x along the optimal capital path {kt}t≥0:
kt+1 =

(1− α)Akαt /2 if pi ≤ pi
αAkαt /pi if pi > pi
Then, starting from k0 > 0, the economy exhibits monotone convergence towards k̂ =
min
{
kD, k?
}
. As ∂x?/∂pi > 0, it is important to note that family transfers depress optimal
capital accumulation and, as long as pi > pi, kt+1 turns out to be decreasing in pi.
As well known, dynamic inefficiency occurs when capital is over-accumulated, i.e. when
the capital stock is greater than the Golden Rule one kG = [Aα]1/(1−α). Then, k? never falls
below kG, while kD is below kG if and only if α > 1/3. Consequently, we can distinguish
two cases according to α.
pi
k
0 1
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k?
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pi
No Trans. Trans.
A  α < 1/3
pi
k
0 1
kD
kG
No Transfers
B  α > 1/3
Figure 3: The steady state capital stock k̂ as a function of pi.
If α is sufficiently large (i.e. α > 1/3) there is no family transfers (since pi > 1) and
dynamic efficiency occurs in the standard Diamond (1965) economy (since kD < kG). Then,
as described in Figure 3.B, we have k̂ = kD whatever pi and the absence of family transfers is
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socially desirable to ensure that we move away from the Golden Rule one. If α is sufficiently
small (i.e. α < 1/3) then pi < 1 and kD > kG. Hence, dynamic inefficiency occurs in
the standard Diamond (1965) economy and family transfers are positive when pi > pi. As
described in Figure 3.A, we have k̂ = kD for pi ≤ pi and k̂ = k? for pi > pi. Then, family
transfers are positive only under dynamic inefficiency and they depress capital accumulation
to approach kG. Such a Golden Rule capital stock is attained if the child imitates his parent's
action (i.e., pi = 1).
4 Conclusion.
The main contribution of this note is to establish that intergenerational family transfers can
be sufficient to cure the dynamic inefficiency arising in a standard Diamond (1965) economy.
Family transfers motives emanate here from the demonstration-effect: a child's propensity
to make transfer can be conditioned by the parental example. In contrast to traditional
remedies (such as public debt), the family transfers do not worsen capital accumulation and
welfare under dynamic efficiency.
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Appendix.
Appendix A.
The dynamics of X (and then of xt), described by (4) and represented in Figure 1 are
straightforward. For x0 6= x?, the distance |xt−x?| increases geometrically and the dynamics
are independent of k. Then, the locus xt+1 = xt expressed as a function of k is a vertical
line with abscissa x? in the plan (x, k). To the left of this line, xt+1 − xt > 0 and, for any
k > 0, xt converges towards 0. To the right of this line, xt+1 − xt < 0 and, for any k > 0, xt
converges towards 1. From (3) the locus kt+1 − kt = 0 as a function of x can be written as
g(x) = [A(1−α)(1+pi−1)(xs−x)] 11−α where xs = (pi−pi/2)/(1+pi). After computations it is
straightforward that g′(x) < 0, g′′(x) > 0, g(xs) = 0 and g(0) = ks = [A− αA(1 + pi−1)] 11−α .
Then, g(x), which represents kt+1 − kt = 0, is a decreasing and convex function of x. The
equation kt+1 = g(x)
1−αkαt can be rewritten as kt+1 − kt = [(g(x)/kt)1−α − 1]kt. Thus,
below the curve kt+1 = kt, for any x ∈ (0, 1), kt converges towards g(x). Above the curve
kt+1 − kt < 0, for any x ∈ (0, 1), kt converges towards g(x). Then, the steady-state (x?, k?)
is a regular saddle point and the dynamics in the neighborhood of (x?, k?) are described in
Figure 2. 
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